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Following last weekend’s German elections, Theofanis Exadaktylos writes on the Greek reaction to
Angela Merkel’s victory. He notes that the elections received extensive coverage in the Greek media
due to their implications for the country’s economic crisis. Nevertheless, the general perception is
that Germany is unlikely to change its course on Europe. The key concern is therefore likely to be
the amount of time it will take for Angela Merkel to form a new governing coalition, as Greece will be
unable to carry out key reforms until this situation is resolved.  
“Triumph for the queen of austerity – Pressure to the South for reforms”*
Angela Merkel’s triumph in the German elections on Sunday and her re-election as Chancellor has made headlines
across the world. But what does her third term in office mean for Greece, which has been struggling with
implementing new measures, taking reforms forward and demonstrating primary surpluses in the budget?
Ever since the election of the new Greek government
and the formation of the coalition in June 2012 there
was a looming milestone for the progression of reforms
and the implementation of austerity in the wider Greek
political discourse: the German elections in September
2013. Beyond the negotiations with the auditors of the
troika; the domestic reaction regarding new austerity
measures and forthcoming reforms; and the struggle to
carry on with privatisation schemes and generating a
primary surplus in the budget; Greek opposition parties
were placing the German elections as a deadline for the
viability of the Greek government.
If someone were to follow the Greek media on the
subject, they would be able to see an extremely high
interest in the outcome of the German elections over
recent months. In the final week before the poll stations
opened, Greek media had devoted plenty of ink and
space as well as special newscasts and talk shows on
the matter. In fact, all major media outlets had sent out
reporters on the ground in Berlin. One would almost
come to the conclusion that elections were taking place in Greece rather than in Germany, with extensive reports on
candidates’ profiles, scenarios for potential coalition governments, forecasts on the main contenders for new
ministerial posts, and other electoral paraphernalia with graphs, expert analysis and huge publicity.
The days before 22 September
So what were the expectations of the Greek public opinion, media and political elites? The primary expectation was
the easing on austerity; perhaps a less powerful Merkel would allow for certain leverage by the Greek government to
ask for time to implement the more radical aspects of the proposed reforms. On the other hand, a more powerful
Merkel would perhaps entail even tougher implementation frameworks. It might mean that the sustainability of Greek
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debt would no longer be guaranteed, which could therefore lead to a further haircut. It could even mean that the well
would run dry on a potential new bailout. In fact, despite the commendation by German government elites on
generating primary surpluses and increasing government revenues in Greece, these very voices also highlighted
that the bailout days were long gone.
The most important concern for Greek politicians, however, was the position of Greece and its sovereign debt on the
political agenda of the new Merkel cabinet. Greece remained high in the debated topics throughout, not as a unique
case, but rather as part of a discussion on how to prevent similar predicaments for other countries in Europe and
how to accelerate the banking union in the EU. At the same time, there was a concern that the relative absence (or
political unwillingness) of Germany to take up its fair share of leadership in Europe had been detrimental to the
Greek problem; hence, Merkel’s potential return to power would signal a change of focus from satisfying domestic
supporters to assuming further responsibility for Europe’s future.
In general, there was a climate of doom surrounding Sunday 22 September, which was cultivated by various
political elites in Greece. This was not necessarily in terms of trying to assess Merkel’s further steps, but rather in
the sense of appropriating the electoral outcome as a way to justify certain political claims and discourses at home.
The queen returned – with a vengeance?
The world did not end for Greece on the announcement of the German exit poll data. The media and political
Cassandras thankfully went unheeded and the Greek government was not particularly holding its breath on that
Sunday evening. Perhaps the political affinity between the Greek PM and the German Chancellor allowed for that
kind of breathing space.
Nonetheless, the Greek public were indeed holding their breath for the outcome. Yet, the momentum was cut short
when a 34-year-old antifascist activist was murdered in broad daylight by a member of the vigilante factions of
Golden Dawn, making the German elections a secondary topic. While all parties across the democratic spectrum
rightly condemned the act and finally began to work on uprooting the neo-fascist monstrosity from the Greek political
scene, some political elites were quick to portray this event in a populist, blame-shifting manner, linking the rise of
Golden Dawn to the austerity policies that Angela Merkel had imposed.
This kind of political attitude and attempted connection is, in the opinion of this author, senseless. It did nothing but
cultivate a climate of ignorance and perpetuate a constant demarcation and scapegoating of particular nations and
their political elites for largely domestic faults. At the same time, it has fostered a negative environment where any
chance of rapprochement and collaboration to come up with mutually beneficial solutions to the crisis is hindered.
And so, in the aftermath of the elections the queen has returned, but not necessarily with a vengeance. Greek
political elites and the media should not be too ambitious when discussing the actual ramifications that a change in
coalition partners may bring for Germany’s European policy and stance towards the Greek issue. It will be debated,
no doubt; but will it make a difference at the end? The FDP, a hardliner concerning the approach towards countries
with severe fiscal problems, may be out of the equation. Yet, the German voters have indeed rewarded the fiscal
responsibility approach that Merkel had been advocating, giving her the upper hand in setting her terms in the
forthcoming coalition government. The rhetoric of the Greens and the SPD will not have more to contribute to an
overall change in the grand strategy.
Therefore, the concern for Greek political elites should now be the time it will take Merkel to form a coalition. The
longer it takes, the longer the Greek issue will be in limbo and that can delay reforms even further. Yet, the only safe
conclusion is that Angela Merkel will persist on pragmatic, cautious and small steps towards a resolution of the
crisis. For anything further, we just need to wait.
*Greek newspaper headline the day after the German elections
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/18taUkl
 _________________________________
About the author
Theofanis Exadaktylos – University of Surrey
Theofanis Exadaktylos is Lecturer in European Politics at the School of Politics, University of Surrey.
His research areas include the Europeanization of the foreign and public policies of member states,
the EU financial crisis’ impact on political trust and populism and EU institutional design. He is also
Research Associate of the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of Economics.
3/3
